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In November 2004, President Vladimir Putin signed legislation that established 
Russia as the 126th country to ratify the Kyoto Treaty to control the emission of 
greenhouse gases (GHG). More importantly, Russia’s ratification cleared the required 
threshold to allow the Treaty to go into force early in 2005.  But, economic uncertainties 
have prompted American policy-makers to withdraw U.S. involvement in the Kyoto 
Treaty.1 The decision not to ratify rests on the fact that the Treaty does not include the 
participation of developing countries. If China, Brazil and India are not included in the 
solution, many believe that efforts by the developed world could be eclipsed and become 
futile. Further, some argue that compliance would damage the American economy; some 
economic models predict a drag on GDP of nearly two percent (while other models 
predict an equal sized boost.2)  
Whether one agrees or disagrees with the rationale to withdraw from Kyoto, one 
thing is certain. While many within the business community dislike the Kyoto Protocol, 
viewing it as a suboptimal mechanism for bringing about a business solution to this 
problem, policy-makers have created what businesses dislike even more – uncertainty. 
Companies need a clear picture of future market environments in order to make strategic 
decisions; and the decision not to ratify the Kyoto Treaty has only been made the future 
market environment cloudier.  
But interestingly, some U.S. companies also see an opportunity in this situation. 
They are taking advantage of the present lack of a mandatory U.S. GHG emission 
reduction program to set targets at their own pace and in their own way; a way that fits 
with their own strategic objectives. Often by drawing off the expertise of industry 
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associations (such as the Business Roundtable), non-profit organizations (such as 
Environmental Defense, the World Resources Institute and the Pew Center on Global 
Climate Change) and the federal government (such as the Climate Leaders Program) 
these companies have chosen to initiate voluntary reductions programs. To date, as many 
as sixty corporations,3 with net revenues of roughly $1.5 trillion,4 have set reduction 
targets. And hundreds more are considering such steps.  
In point of fact, many of these companies are agnostic about the science of 
climate change or the social responsibility of protecting the global climate. The reasons 
that they are making these emission reductions are decidedly strategic. They are 
searching for ways to be prepared for the long term should GHG emission reductions 
become mandatory, while at the same time attempting to reap near term economic and 
strategic benefits should that future not emerge or be delayed. At a time when even some 
industry groups are pushing for corporate action on climate change – notably, the 
Conference Board warned that “businesses that ignore the debate over climate change do 
so at their peril,”5 – many forward thinking U.S. companies have decided that it is in their 
best interests to hedge their strategic bets, preparing for either scenario. Using examples 
of specific business actions, this paper will assess a series of ways in which this is being 
done. 
 
Business Logic and Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Reductions. 
The strategic reasons for adopting voluntary GHG reductions are as varied as the 
companies that are undertaking them. These companies range in size from $350 million 
in annual sales to $186 billion. Some are multi-national corporations; others are primarily 
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U.S. based in their market scope. Some are public, others are private and still others are 
government owned. They are from industry sectors as diverse as oil, pharmaceuticals and 
financial services. Some have adopted modest goals (e.g. one percent reduction in GHGs 
per year over four years) while others have adopted more aggressive goals (e.g. twenty-
five percent reduction from 1990 levels by 2011).6 Some are relative newcomers in their 
efforts7 while others have been working on them for years.8  
In order to understand these initiatives, we must begin by shifting our view of 
controls on GHG emissions from a strictly environmental issue driven by regulatory or 
social pressures to a strategic issue driven by market pressures. Greenhouse gas controls 
represent a market transition; one not unlike those that have occurred in the past where 
consumer needs change or technology advances. In such circumstances, companies face 
new competitive environments where some will decline while others rise to fill their 
place. The typewriter industry was virtually eliminated by the computer in the early 
1980s; the compact disc replaced the phonograph album in the mid-1980s; the 1984 
dissolution of the Bell System wrought structural changes in the telecommunications 
industry.9  
Climate change will present just such a transition. But unlike these other market 
shifts, climate change represents a transition of a fairly new and unusual kind. In regions 
where Kyoto is ratified, it amounts to the establishment of a new world-wide market in 
pollution, pollution credits, capital and emissions abatement technology. So, companies 
that are adept at (a) reducing their GHG emissions by altering products or processes, (b) 
trading in emission credits so as to capitalize on this new commodity market or (c) 
developing and marketing new management skills or technologies that produce less 
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greenhouse gases will find advantage in the emerging climate change market transition. 
And in regions where Kyoto remains unratified, companies may still find themselves in 
an altered landscape, as their competitors, suppliers, buyers, consumers, investors and 
government adopt concerns for GHG reductions either because they operate in ratified 
regions or because they see a proactive stance in GHG reductions as wise business 
strategy.  
In either case, the key to financially successful emissions reductions requires an 
assessment of a company’s strategic positioning vis-à-vis GHG emissions. And to do this, 
companies must ask new kinds of questions and undertake new kinds of analysis. How 
energy efficient are your operations? How much carbon dioxide and other greenhouse 
gases does your company produce; and from where (in processes and products)? Do you 
know the available technologies or alternatives for reducing those emissions or for 
gaining greater energy efficiency? Do you know the costs and benefits associated with 
such technologies? Do you have an ability to forecast the future direction of regulations 
on greenhouse gases? Do you know how to influence the form of those regulations? Do 
you know how to engage in commodity trading of GHG emissions so as to gain the most 
economic benefit (or least economic cost) in any efforts undertaken to lower your climate 
change impact? How will you build your new facilities to be prepared for future GHG 
reductions? These questions are both unfamiliar to most corporations and still fluid in 
their full import. The actual form of the market transition over climate change has yet to 
be realized and therefore, many companies simply do not know their potential exposure 
and strategic positioning on this issue.  
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But, as in any such market transition, there are great opportunities and grave 
implications. There will be winners and losers; those with an interest in resisting and 
trying to delay such a market transformation and those who will try to capitalize on it. 
The difference between these two groups lies in a careful cost/benefit analysis of doing 
something versus doing nothing. Not all companies will benefit from GHG reductions 
and voluntary reduction programs must be based on sound business logic. They must 
have a bottom line rationale or such efforts will be financially unsustainable.  
Analyzing this bottom line rationale is the direction of the rest of this paper. It 
will describe how companies have presently sought strategic benefits from voluntary 
GHG reductions and cluster those efforts in seven different categories: (1) operational 
improvement, (2) anticipating and influencing climate change regulations, (3) accessing 
new sources of capital, (4) improving risk management, (5) elevating corporate 
reputation, (6) identifying new market opportunities, and (7) enhancing human resource 
management.10 In each of these categories, new kinds of questions are presented to help 
companies ascertain their vulnerability under a climate change protocol. Through this 
analysis, this paper will enjoin the on-going debate over whether it “pays to be green.”11  
In many ways, it shows how the question needs to be reframed.  The more important 
questions revolve around first identifying for who being green can pay and then second, 
how and when they can make that happen.12
 
1. Operational Improvement.  
Within the environmental management literature, there is a great deal of research 
in the area of pollution prevention.  This work has revolved around dematerialization of 
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production processes,13 optimization of the supply chain logistics, developing more 
efficient manufacturing processes,14 utilizing green materials and processes, shifting from 
products to services in the marketplace15 and linking companies together within their 
industrial ecologies.16  One recurrent theme that runs through these literatures is the 
identification of managerial and operational biases that shield managers from identifying 
such opportunities.17  Traditionally, environmental protection has not been seen as a 
profit-making opportunity within firms.  But when environmental issues are viewed from 
the perspective of strategic opportunities and framed in traditional economic terms of net 
present value, return on investment or return on equity, these opportunities become more 
visible.   
In the same line of reasoning, what follows are examples of reductions in GHG 
emissions that can at times expose opportunities for process optimization that can lower 
energy costs, reduce material utilization rates, minimize emissions or lower costs of 
transportation.18 The key to transferring the opportunities mentioned here into other 
contexts and settings is careful consideration of the economic costs and benefits of such 
efforts as they relate to specific internal hurdle rates and the opportunity costs of 
conducting these initiatives versus other available initiatives. 
Energy cost reductions. The first and central issue for any assessment of the 
economics of GHG reductions deals with energy use. How energy efficient are your 
operations? Is your company at the limits of efficiency? Some companies have begun to 
ask these questions in conjunction with their GHG reduction programs and found 
economic gains waiting. Cinergy, one of the nation’s largest coal-fired electric utilities 
has pledged to cut its emissions of carbon dioxide by five percent by 2010 to 2012 
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(despite expected annual electricity growth of two percent per year). With present output 
at 67 million tons per year, the company plans to spend $21 million on the initiative, two-
thirds of which will go towards upgrading the efficiency of the company’s plants.19 Will 
this initiative yield economic benefits? 
Other companies have more experience in programs similar to Cynergy’s and 
have documented the economic benefits with a track-record of success. Ontario Power 
Generation, one of North America’s largest electricity generators, has exceeded its goal 
of cutting emissions to 1990 levels by 2000 by reducing the use of its own energy. As the 
company is also one of its largest consumers – running its 60 hydroelectric dams, 6 
nuclear reactors and 3 fossil fuel plants consumes as much electricity in a year as a 
community of 500,000 - the utility cut its internal needs by more than 2,000 gigawatts per 
hour, in the process reducing GHG emissions by 2.5 million tons a year and saving $90 
million in energy costs.20 And BP, one of the early movers in the area of GHG 
reductions, has surpassed its Kyoto target and claims to have saved $650 million by 
reducing energy waste.21  
These energy use reductions come from sources both complex and as simple as 
lighting upgrades. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency estimates that efficient 
lighting could reduce the nation’s electricity demand by more than ten percent, resulting 
in a net savings of $17 billion and a reduction of 202 million metric tons of carbon 
dioxide emissions. Of the thousands of corporations, hospitals, schools, utilities, and state 
and local governments that have signed on to the EPA’s Green Lights program, the 
average internal rate of return on investments in lighting upgrades is roughly twenty-eight 
percent;
22 a number that surpasses the internal hurdle rate of many corporate investments. 
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But such initiatives are often overlooked because companies do not look to lighting 
upgrades as a high profile source of strategic advantage.   
Those companies that see opportunity in lighting and other efficiency upgrades 
have realized benefits. Canadian First Place, for example, invested $6.5 million in more 
energy efficient heating and lighting equipment that cut GHG emissions by 27,000 tons 
per year. The project is expected to pay for itself in 3 years.23 And the Hudson Bay 
Company claims that its new stores are designed to consume twenty-five percent less 
energy than if they were built to current building code and overall, the company claims to 
have saved $41 million (Canadian) on annual energy expenses by installing energy 
efficient heating and lighting systems (with a two-year payoff).24  In the U.S., where 
lighting accounts for up to twenty percent of electricity, these examples offer a glimpse 
of efficiency opportunities that may await companies that seek them.   
Operational cost reductions. Beyond the economic benefits of energy 
efficiency, some companies have realized operational cost improvements as well. An 
assessment of GHG emissions and opportunities for their reduction often exposes new 
insights into taken-for-granted or under-studied operational parameters. Alcoa, for 
example, has realized economic benefits from its attention to its aluminum smelting 
operations. One element of these operations is what’s called the “anode effect;” events 
where the amount of dissolved aluminum drops to levels that interfere with operations. In 
the past this was a way to establish the dissolved alumina in the cell eutectic, since it is 
impossible to measure the alumina concentration directly in 1000 degree centigrade 
molten material. This anode effect creates perfluorocarbons, which are potent greenhouse 
gases. By studying ways to better manage and measure the cell inputs so that anode 
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effects are no longer necessary to establish alumina concentration, the company has been 
able to better understand how to minimize these events and therefore, create the 
efficiencies and yield improvements that come from better process control and 
management.25 Similarly BP saved $1 million by reducing the flaring of gas emissions at 
its refineries and was able to reduce another 500,000 tons of carbon dioxide equivalent in 
methane by replacing pneumatic valves with electronic ones in pipelines. And by selling 
the saved methane rather than venting it, the project realized a sixty-seven percent 
return.26  
Other industrial sectors are searching for similar gains from better management 
practices. Encouraged under President Bush’s Climate VISION (Voluntary Innovative 
Sector Initiatives: Opportunities Now) program27 twelve industrial sectors pledged to 
voluntarily reduce emission intensity ranging from three to eighteen percent by 2012, as 
compared to 1990 levels.28 These reductions will come from some attention to basic 
operational activities. Major oil companies, for example, have agreed to scour pipelines 
and oil fields for leaking methane, another powerful GHG. And coal companies have 
promised to expand efforts to capture methane and other greenhouse gases escaping from 
mines.29  
Energy cost reductions from transportation. Not all operational improvements 
lie within the operating plant. Some companies’ operations may focus more on the 
transportation or distribution of goods. PHH Arval, one of the country’s largest fleet 
management companies, has begun to help its clients better understand the carbon 
dioxide emissions from their fleets, and in the process reduce their transportation costs. 
According to President and CEO George Kilroy, the three most important considerations 
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for his clients are depreciation costs, fuel costs and maintenance. By altering the types of 
vehicles they use in their fleets, as well as better management practices, corporations can 
reduce fuel costs and receive GHG reduction credits to be applied towards their overall 
goals. A fleet of 1,000 vehicles, for example, produces an estimated 14,000 tons of GHG 
emissions. By shifting from full-size to mid-size cars, from SUVs to mid-size or 
introducing hybrids into the fleet, these emissions could be reduced by as much as one-
third. To aid in this direction and offer the most benefit to its clients, PHH Arval has now 
augmented its selection template to allow companies to choose its fleet allocation based, 
not only on concerns such as cost and safety, but also on “green ratings” created by the 
American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy. And given the nearly 3.1 million 
cars and trucks in corporate fleets in the United States, PHH Arval estimates that carbon 
dioxide reduction potential could reach 2.5 million tons with a fuel cost reduction of as 
much as ten percent.30
Other companies are taking similar steps to reduce the environmental impact of 
their fleets. FedEx, for example, has taken steps towards shifting its fleet from diesel to 
hybrid electric-diesel engines.31 Beginning in July 2003, the company began operating 20 
diesel-electric hybrid vehicles. Although the capital costs of such vehicles are higher, the 
fuel costs are fifty percent lower, while carbon dioxide are reduced by thirty-three 
percent, particulate emissions are lowered by ninety percent, and nitrogen dioxide 
emissions are lowered by seventy-five percent. If the test fleet is (economically and 
environmentally) successful, the company hopes to shift its entire fleet of 30,000 vehicles 
over to hybrids over the next 10 years. The United Parcel Service has also taken steps on 
alternative fuel vehicles, beginning tests on the first delivery truck powered by hydrogen 
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fuel cells as an addition to its present fleet of 1,000 natural gas powered vans, which 
produce less carbon dioxide and particulates.  
And not all transportation improvements require technological solutions. The 
Beer Store (owned by Labatt, Molson and Sleeman) found that it could cut $17,000 a 
year in annual fuel costs and 114 tons in carbon dioxide emissions by changing the 
behavior of its delivery truck drivers. In a pilot project in London Ontario, the company 
cut the drivers’ idling time in half, or about 3,000 hours per year and increased fuel 
efficiency by fourteen percent. One simple step towards this goal was to dispel the myth 
that drivers needed to idle their truck for five minutes at the end of the day to avoid 
damaging the diesel engine.32
Energy cost reductions shared across sectors and regions. The economic 
benefits of GHG reductions do not always accrue to one company but can also be more 
broadly distributed. This has led more than 130 U.S. cities – discharging about fifteen 
percent of the nation’s GHG emissions – to reduce their GHG emissions under the Cities 
for Climate Protection campaign. Denver, Minneapolis-St. Paul and Miami-Dade County, 
for example, have all committed to reducing their emissions twenty percent below 1988 
levels by 2005.33  
While these initiatives are relatively new, other cities have established a track 
record in this area. Copenhagen, for example, has reduced its emission by twenty-two 
percent based on 1990 levels.34 And some cities have measured the benefits in economic 
terms. In Toronto, for example, where buildings generate up to seventy percent of the 
city’s greenhouse gases,35 the Toronto Better Buildings Partnership has retrofitted 467 
buildings, resulting in a reduction of $19 million in annual operating costs; the creation of 
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3,800 person years of employment; $126 million in economic activity and a decrease in 
carbon dioxide emissions by 132,000 tons per year.36 The direct investment for these 
gains was $126 million while the return on investment averaged fourteen percent per year 
and the simple payback period averaged about seven years.37  Calgary has exceeded its 
reduction target while staying fifty percent under budget. Net costs to taxpayers are 
anticipated to be zero. Canadian officials report that efforts by municipalities alone could 
make up for twenty-five percent of Canada’s Kyoto goal.38  
But the solutions and the economic benefits can go further if one considers other 
important factors. Urban temperatures often run as much as 5°F higher than surrounding 
suburbs. One sixth of U.S. electricity consumption goes to cool buildings at a cost of 
roughly $40 billion. Energy reductions in urban heat islands have significant economic 
costs in terms of energy use and also medical costs. High temperatures convert nitrogen 
oxides and volatile organic compounds from cars and smokestacks into ozone, a main 
ingredient for smog. Ozone is estimated to be responsible for about $3 billion in health 
related costs each year in the Los Angeles basin alone. But, through the use of lighter 
colors for roofs and pavement and the planting of urban trees, temperatures, energy use 
and smog could all be reduced. The DOE estimates that such initiatives in Los Angeles 
could lower the average summer afternoon temperature by 5°F, cutting the need for air 
conditioning by eighteen percent for a savings of $175 million per year and reduce 
carbon dioxide emissions in the process. This initiative would also reduce smog levels, 
for additional savings of $360 million in smog-related expenses.39 Taking steps already, 
Houston is looking at planting more greenery as a way to reduce the “urban heat island,” 




2. Anticipating and Influencing Climate Change Regulations.  
While regulatory compliance is typically viewed as a cost of doing business, the 
regulatory terrain of climate change is complex and emerging on many levels.  In order to 
think strategically about climate change regulations, business managers must have a 
multi-pronged approach.  They must be aware of developments in policy standards at the 
international, national and regional levels; they must be prepared to respond if and when 
standards emerge; and finally, they must assess whether they can have an influence on 
the form of what those standards might be.  
Emerging policies on the international level. Even before the Kyoto Treaty was 
ratified by the requisite number of countries to go into force, many countries decided to 
commit themselves to reducing their GHG emissions.  Central to the Kyoto Treaty and all 
related national programs is an emissions trading scheme.  Some countries have 
established these schemes as a way to develop and perfect the necessary procedures 
before they become necessary.  Others have taken that final step and put their trading 
schemes into force.  According to the World Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund, there have 
been between $350 and $500 million in carbon trades between 1996 and 2002, most on 
an ad hoc basis or as part of the growing number of schemes established by countries, 
companies, regions and states.41 Britain introduced the world’s first organized trading 
system in 200142 and the world’s first sizeable spot market in the trading of greenhouse 
gases in 2002.43 In December 2002, the Slovak Republic announced the first trade of a 
government quota under the regime set up by Kyoto – the sale of GHG emission 
allowances to a Japanese group.44 The European Union’s GHG emissions trading scheme 
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will be introduced in January 2005.45 And Canada has announced plans to soon follow 
with its own cap and trade program.46 And the ranks of countries developing GHG 
trading schemes continues to grow. In 2002, even China announced that it would ratify 
Kyoto.47
Given such developments, multi-national corporations face practical strategic 
reasons to become familiar with internal GHG measurements, reduction strategies and 
external trading schemes, given that at least some of their operations will likely find them 
in a regulated regime. But to be a strategic player in GHG reductions will require a 
familiarity in GHG emissions measurement and commodity trading, two relatively new 
areas of expertise. As a result, some companies have created internal GHG trading 
systems to prepare themselves for potential future regulations. Alcoa, the world’s largest 
aluminum producer has started an internal system for curbing GHG emissions from its 
businesses around the world.48 Similarly, Motorola and Waste Management have all 
adopted internal cap and trade schemes under the assumption that the regulation of 
greenhouse gases is inevitable.49 BP and Shell have both been long time developers of 
internal emissions trading schemes (and both have ended those initiatives due to 
organized trading pursuant to the British and EU Trading Directives). 
Emerging policies on the national level. Companies whose operations do not 
take them beyond U.S. borders may also need to assess their vulnerability to a GHG 
reduction scheme. As many as forty-five bills have been put forward in Congress to 
control GHG emissions in some shape or fashion. Most recently, a bill proposed by 
Senators McCain and Lieberman would have required U.S. power plants and industries to 
reduce GHG emissions to 2000 levels by 2010 and then make further reductions to 1990 
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levels by 2016. It also proposed a trading mechanism as well as a program to offer credits 
to farmers who sequester carbon in soil.50 While the bill was defeated, it is significant 
that the vote was 55-43 against adoption. The last time the Senate voted on such a bill 
was in 1997 when they voted 95-0 to reject the Kyoto Protocol.51 Bills proposing 
regulatory schemes will likely evolve towards a form that will satisfy policy makers. 
Towards that end, the bill’s sponsors vow to press on and have been able to gain 
bipartisan as well as industry and NGO support for their efforts. 
Emerging policies on the state level. Regardless of federal level standards, 
companies are facing an increasingly complex set of standards that vary by state. In July 
2002, California Governor Gray Davis signed the nation's first bill to regulate GHG 
emissions from automobiles by the 2008 model year.52 Since California is the largest car 
market in the U.S., this could alter auto fleets nationwide. Further, on the initiative of 
New York Governor George Pataki, ten Northeast states announced a plan for a regional 
system that would go into effect in April 2005 to limit carbon dioxide emissions from 
power plants in a cap and trade scheme.53 The six New England states have also adopted 
a plan to reduce their GHG emissions ten percent below 1990 levels by 2010 – a more 
aggressive approach than Kyoto.54 Moving beyond non-binding commitments, Maine’s 
Governor signed a law in June 2003 with an aggressive plan to cut carbon dioxide to 
1990 levels by 2010.55 New Jersey has pledged to reduce statewide emissions by three 
and one-half percent from 1990 levels by 200556 and has also signed agreements with its 
largest utility and all fifty-six colleges and universities to reduce emissions below 1990 
levels.57 Washington has recently announced its intent to join Oregon and California in 
pursuing climate change reductions on the west coast. 
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Given these multiple developments, it is clear that even domestic companies will 
face uncertain regulatory landscapes with regards to climate change. So, whether it is the 
variety of international standards that multi-national corporations must face or the variety 
of state level standards that multi-national and domestic companies must face, one 
strategy behind voluntary GHG reductions comes down to the operating benefits of 
normalizing operations across regional contexts. Maintaining multiple systems for 
accounting for carbon dioxide emissions can create an economic drag on the balance 
sheet while uniform operating standards (as well as internal trading schemes) can help 
improve the economics of a GHG reduction plan.  
Influencing future regulations. Climate change strategy can also involve more 
than simply forecasting or reacting to regulatory changes. It can also involve being 
proactive in influencing policies that benefit a company’s particular climate change 
positioning.58 At the most basic level, companies that have taken early steps on voluntary 
reductions in GHG emissions may find it advantageous to compel other, less committed, 
competitors to follow suit. Whether these competitors are ill-prepared for such 
regulations or operationally limited in the extent to which they can comply, the enactment 
of new emissions laws can shift the market environment, creating opportunities for those 
that are most prepared and able. For example, Alcoa, one company with extremely 
aggressive GHG reduction goals, has been lobbying the federal government to adopt 
GHG requirements. Testifying in a Senate subcommittee in early 2003, Randy Overby, 
President of Alcoa’s energy business stated “Rather than further debate the science, we 
have decided that the risk of significant climate change is an issue of vital importance 
requiring action.”59 In another example, Xcel Energy was able to work with the 
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Minnesota legislature to promote recent changes in Minnesota law that will allow utilities 
to gain the economic benefits of recovering costs of their voluntary emissions reduction 
programs.60  
In markets where GHG reduction goals are being established, competitive 
advantage can accrue to the company that can influence those standards in favor of their 
own operations. For example, emissions trading can be accomplished through multiple 
methods of measuring, quantifying and exchanging credits. How these schemes actually 
become set by regulation will cause some companies to adapt to a new set of protocols 
where others may find that their own internal programs are already consistent with these 
schemes. If a company can influence the final form of such programs to match their own 
internally developed schemes, they will not have to make operational changes to comply 
while their competitors will have to adapt to their already running programs. They are, in 
effect, setting their own programs as the government mandated industry standard. BP, for 
example, has more than five years of experience in emissions trading, having launched an 
experimental intra-company market in 1998 that allows business units to buy and sell 
credits amongst themselves. BP's expertise in cap and trade earned the company an 
advisory role in designing the British GHG Emissions Trading System.61 Similarly, 
Shell's experience with their own emissions trading desk allowed them an advisory role 
in developing the E.U.'s Trading Directive, due to go into effect in 2005. These programs 
bear distinct elements that reflect these company’s specific experiences and expertise in 
GHG trading. 
 
3. Accessing New Sources of Capital.  
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Directly related to the issue of GHG trading schemes is the availability of capital. 
For instance, governments are entering such schemes by introducing financial incentives 
to reduce GHGs. The first trade in the British spot market involved an auction for £215 
million in financial incentives from the government.62 It is estimated that the reduction 
would have cost £247 million in the absence of trading63 and the thirty-four companies 
that bought the credits (including Shell, BP, DuPont, ICI, Blue Circle, Tesco, British 
Airways and the Natural History Museum) agreed to cut their emissions by more than 
four million tons over five years in return for £53.37 per ton.64 One of the participants, 
DuPont (which took over ICI’s nylon producing plan in Wilton, Cleveland, UK) reduced 
emissions of nitrous oxide, a GHG that is 310 times more potent than carbon dioxide, by 
developing a process that safely broke down the compound into nitrogen and oxygen 
which can be safely released into the atmosphere. The abatement equipment cost £6 
million, and the company hopes to receive £26.7 million from the British government in 
compensation.65 Since then, the company installed the technology into its plants 
worldwide, cutting GHG emissions by 60 million tons a year.66 In similar examples, the 
Dutch government has been paying about $10 a ton for GHG reductions in its recent 
market-trading scheme. And the World Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund will give credits 
to companies that help developing countries shift to technology that reduces carbon 
dioxide emissions. The credits would be valid, tradable, financial instruments. 
Becoming even more creative, some jurisdictions are holding “reverse auctions,” 
where a national or local agency declares that they have a fixed amount of money to 
“buy” GHG reductions. Entities such as companies, power stations, and farmers then bid 
on how much GHG they can deliver at that price. The agency then sorts the bids and 
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takes the most cost effective ones in terms of GHG reductions for the price.67 So, the 
company that is able to generate GHG reductions at the lowest price stands to yield 
dividends for its efforts. 
Those dividends could come from governments at the outset, but will likely come 
more from interfirm trading as the Kyoto Treaty goes into effect.  How much money is at 
stake here?  Richard Sandor, chairman of the Chicago Climate Exchange, estimates the 
market could be as large as the $5 billion annual market for sulfur dioxide.68 The World 
Bank foresees a $10 billion market in GHG emissions by 2006.69 CO2e.com estimates 
the range from $10 billion to $3 trillion by 2010.70 Others estimate it could be as large as 
$100 billion per year after the treaty goes into effect.71   
There are, of course, contingencies on these size estimates that must be weighed 
into any climate change strategy. One contingency is the inclusion of carbon sinks and 
the exclusion of trade ceilings, which send conflicting signals through the market. 
Demand for carbon is bolstered (prices raised) by the Kyoto Protocol’s lack of an explicit 
ceiling on the number of credits that countries can buy to meet their targets. But also, 
demand is reduced (prices lowered) because Russia, Japan and Canada have been 
awarded substantial allowances from the carbon stored in forests towards their emissions 
reductions.72 Other contingencies rest on who participates. According to the research 
group, Climate Strategies, the market will be about $9 billion with the assumption that 
the EU, Japan, Canada, Australia and New Zealand are potential buyers of credits. And 
the size of this market would increase substantially if the U.S. were to join the group of 
potential buyers. The right to emit one metric ton of carbon dioxide now sells for $3 to $8 
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according to Jack Cogen, chief executive at Natsource. If American companies do finally 
join, the price of permits will go up due to increased demand.73   
But, until they do, the absence of U.S. participation from the market for credits 
can limit strategic benefits for domestic interests. Many American companies will find it 
hard to buy or sell credits with companies under the Kyoto regime.74 For example, 
Canada, which had been buying large volumes of American emissions reductions in 
recent years, scaled back since it became clear the American reductions would not be 
compliant with Kyoto.75 If the U.S. does not ratify the treaty, credits sold to companies in 
participating countries could not be counted towards their Kyoto targets.76 To hedge this 
bet, companies have been searching ways for registering their reductions such as through 
the Department of Energy’s GHG registry. 
 
4. Improving Risk Management.  
Greenhouse gas reductions can become an opportunity to reduce financial risks. 
According to the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies, there are 
presently $7.4 trillion of corporate assets that could be threatened by climate change.77 
This leads the group to conclude that corporate board members and senior executives (as 
well as institutional investors) can no longer ignore such costs and would be negligent in 
their fiscal responsibilities should they do so. These risks can be categorized into two 
domains. 
Natural consequences. The first category is the risks associated with the 
damages and remediation due to climate change itself (as a result of droughts, floods and 
hurricanes). In the U.S., these damages have been on the rise. In 1998, weather related 
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disasters such as fires, floods, storms and droughts caused approximately $89 billion in 
economic losses globally. This surpassed the previous record of $60 billion in 1996. 
78
 
And some insurers are worrying that climate change could cause substantial losses in the 
years ahead. While the economic costs have not been totally calculated yet, the hurricane 
damages of 2004 stand to break another record.  
In the face of such developments, Swiss Re, a large multi-national insurance 
company reported that “The more quickly and radically the global climate changes, the 
more extreme weather patterns could cause damage which not only pose a threat to 
individual citizens, families and enterprises but could also jeopardize whole cities and 
branches of the economy and — on a global scale — entire states and social systems. In 
brief: damage which had better not be risked because it can no longer be handled.”79 
Even the Pentagon has speculated that climate change could have serious economic 
implications by causing droughts which cripple farms and devastate forests; in some 
scenarios even destabilizing present geo-political arrangements.80  Swiss Re estimates 
that global warming could cost $300 billion annually by 2050 in weather damage, 
pollution, industrial and agricultural losses and other expenses. These costs vary by 
region of the world (as shown in table 1) and by sector.  Real estate, for example, will be 
affected by coastal flooding while timber and farming will be affected by droughts.  
 
Insert table 1 here 
 
Financial consequences. The second category of risk is that associated with the 
costs of greenhouse emissions under a mandatory GHG mitigation scheme. Companies 
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could face unexpected expenses with regulations, fines, taxes and caps on products and 
processes that produce greenhouse gases. Some estimate the total exposure of the 
electricity utility industry alone to carbon dioxide controls at more than $60 billion 
annually.
81
 So, many feel that they must prepare their companies today for any 
regulations tomorrow. Cinergy, for example, has seventy-five percent of its physical 
assets and as much as ninety-seven percent of its energy generation coming from coal 
(the rest coming from natural gas). To ignore the possibility of carbon restrictions would 
be fiscally irresponsible. To protect its assets, the company has decided to make 
reductions today based on their assessment of where policy may head using barometers 
such as the McCain-Leiberman bill that was voted down in Congress.82  
Such business realities have led to a push for more public disclosure on GHG 
liabilities. In May 2002, the Rockefeller Philanthropy Advisors organized the Carbon 
Disclosure Project, mobilizing $4 trillion in institutional investors to petition 500 large 
corporations to quantify their GHG emissions. They estimate that share prices could fall 
as much as forty percent for heavy carbon-emitting industries and twenty-nine percent for 
banks without adequate carbon risk management strategies.83 In response to this type of 
concern, DuPont, BP and Ford have begun to address risk from climate change in their 
annual reports and S.E.C. filings.  
Others have suggested that corporate officers may be held accountable for failing 
to protect their companies from climate related risk. In 2002, a shareholder resolution 
sought to reduce the duties of Lee Raymond, chairman and CEO of Exxon-Mobil, 
because of his position that climate change was not a problem for the company. The 
resolution got a surprising twenty percent supporting vote. And this is not the only such 
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resolution. In the 2003 proxy season, there were as many as nineteen resolutions filed 
regarding climate change issues, two-thirds of which received more than twenty percent 
supporting votes, including GE (twenty-two percent), American Standard (twenty-nine 
percent) Eastman Chemical Co. (twenty-nine percent) and AEP (twenty-seven percent).84 
Directors at Swiss Re see future shareholder actions as a clear liability issue for corporate 
managements and boards.  
 
5. Elevating Corporate Reputation.  
Greenhouse gas reductions may be an opportunity to enhance a corporation’s 
reputation. This can have important benefits with a variety of constituencies, including, 
but not limited to: voters who may influence future policy; jurors who may sit in 
judgment on legal cases; investors who may consider environmental strategies in making 
investments; communities who may influence a company’s ability to expand or site new 
facilities; reporters who may write stories about a company’s initiatives; employees who 
may work for a company; activists who may decide to protest a company’s operations; 
and consumers who may purchase a company’s products or services.   
But gaining reputational advantage from climate change is difficult given the 
public’s uncertain thinking on the issue. On the one hand, a Zogby poll found that 
seventy-five percent of 1,200 Americans polled supported the idea of requiring major 
industries to reduce their GHG emissions.85 On the other hand, an NEETF survey found 
that most Americans are fairly illiterate when it comes to environmental issues. For 
example, a majority of the public think (incorrectly) that the majority of our energy is 
produced in non-air polluting ways such as hydro-electric power and only one in three 
24 
  
sees coal burning as an issue.86 (In actuality, coal is the primary source of electric power 
in this country, producing more than fifty percent of the energy mix and nearly eighty 
percent of the carbon dioxide within the energy sector.87 The U.S. alternative power 
sector produces only about ten percent of the U.S. energy needs.) 
The opportunities in improving reputation through voluntary GHG initiatives lie 
in engaging constituencies that are important for your company’s success. For example, 
McDonalds engaged with critics from Greenpeace to offset costly protests and image 
problems over its use of refrigerants that contribute to global warming. The company 
convened a “refrigeration summit” with activists, government experts and suppliers to 
explore less polluting activities. In January 2003, a McDonalds in Denmark became what 
the company says is the world’s first fast food restaurant that uses refrigerants that do not 
contain Freon or hydroflourocarbons.88 Similarly, Cinergy plans to achieve its carbon 
dioxide reduction goal of five percent by 2010 to 2012 by working with its customer 
base, creating incentive programs to reduce consumer demand during hot months,89 and 
in the process gained valuable customer goodwill.  
The benefits of such initiatives and reputation management, while difficult to 
quantify, are not lost on large corporate sectors that see the reputation of the entire 
industry as superseding that of a single company. The International Aluminum Institute 
(IAI) claims that the industry has cut GHG emissions in some cases by forty percent 
between 1990 and 2000 and perflourocarbons (PFC) by sixty-five percent between 1990 
and 2001. The industry has attempted to present a greener image by touting that more 
than a quarter of aluminum demand is met by recycling, which uses only five percent of 
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the energy needed to make primary aluminum. The motivation for such efforts is often to 
satisfy or neutralize conflicting interests that may impinge on industry operations.90  
BP has benefited from avoiding such conflicting interests by its highly visible 
embracement of climate change as a strategic initiative. When John Browne first 
articulated his vision for the company in 1997, the oil industry ranked at the bottom of 
most public opinion polls since the early 1990s.91 In the wake of his announcements and 
the efforts that followed, the company enjoys high public approval ratings that now 
translate into more understanding treatment from environmental activists, the government 
and the press (reporters have been less critical of the company’s stands on issues such as 
drilling in ANWR),. 
 
6. Identifying New Market Opportunities.  
Greenhouse gas reductions can expose important information and insights for 
guiding new strategic directions. By measuring environmental costs and risks associated 
with product or process lines and remaining alert to changes in consumer preference, 
media attention, community concerns and regulatory program trends, companies can exit 
increasingly risky business areas in favor of more secure options. This can manifest itself 
in a number of ways.  
For example, certain product markets offer opportunities to reduce carbon load 
and improve market performance. One area with a great deal of activity is bio-materials, 
which shift the raw material for synthetics away from fossil fuels. DuPont wants to 
generate twenty-five percent of its revenues from renewable resources by 2010 (the 
figure in 2003 was fourteen percent). To do this, the company hopes to divest its large, 
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oil based textiles and interiors unit, which makes nylon, polyester and Lycra and instead 
make clothes from corn (such as Sorona, a new stretchable fabric made from corn).92 
Cargill Dow LLC is also seeking to make “bio-material” products like T-shirts, socks, 
milk bottles and auto parts out of corn-starch. The company makes a product called 
NatureWorks PLA which Coca-Cola is using to make soft drink cups, McDonalds is 
using for salad containers and Pacific Coast Feather is using to fill pillows and 
comforters. This reduces dependence on oil (an allied driver of climate strategy), reduces 
GHG production, eliminates toxic materials from the ecosystem, and reduces associated 
regulatory burdens. The farm bill passed by the House in 2002 authorizes $5 million in 
2002 and $14 million a year from 2003 to 2007 to fund biomass research and make grants 
to build “biorefineries.” Almost all the world’s major chemical makers are investing in 
biomass research to some degree, including BASF AG, Celanese AG, Chevron Texaco 
Corp., DSM NV, DuPont and Dow Chemical.93
Increased activity in GHG reductions could create new markets or enhance 
existing ones for companies and industries. For example, there is an entire service and 
technology sector that specializes in GHG (and other pollution) reduction technologies. 
Environmental industries in Canada employed more than 120,000 people and had 1997 
sales in excess of $20 billion, representing just over two percent of Canada’s GDP.94 In 
the United States, there are 45,000 firms in the environmental technology sector. That 
sector enjoyed a $186 billion U.S. market in 1997,
95
 while the global market is estimated 
at $468 billion
96
 (The other two major markets include Western Europe at $137 billion 
and Japan at $89 billion.
97
) and reaching $215 billion by 2002. Some estimates see the 
sector for new energy technologies growing to between $10 and $20 trillion by 2025.98 
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But with the U.S. abstention from Kyoto, there is concern over limited market access for 
U.S. clean technologies and the development of this growing industry. 
Further, government policy on GHG emissions could alter market environments, 
creating opportunities for some, and problems for others. For example, one clear area 
where new strategic opportunities may emerge is in the development of large-scale 
alternative energy schemes. A half dozen states including Illinois, Nevada and Texas 
have enacted laws to require increasing portions of electricity come from renewable 
sources.99 Texas’s renewable energy standard has resulted in the biggest wind power 
construction boom the nation has ever seen.100 In September 2003, California, Oregon 
and Washington announced that they will buy cars that emit low levels of carbon dioxide 
for the use by state employees.101 The Dutch government has earmarked a million GHG 
credits for wind farm projects planned by Meridian Energy and TrustPower.102 Japan and 
Germany are heavily funding solar roofs to stimulate the market for photovoltaics. France 
is subsidizing energy audits and counseling people to travel less. Japan is funding 
research on renewables. Austria is committed to having seventy-eight percent of energy 
generation from renewables, Sweden sixty percent, Portugal thirty-nine percent, Finland, 
Spain and Denmark over twenty-five percent. Iceland, rich in thermal energy, has 
become the first country in the world to make a commitment towards becoming a 
hydrogen economy and extract energy from water.103
One brand new market that could be created by GHG trading is carbon 
sequestration. The Environmental Quality Incentive Program under the 2002 farm bill 
will pay farmers for converting to no-tillage farming, which traps and stores more carbon. 
An average acre of cropland sequesters about 74 tons of carbon. Under alternative 
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techniques, the same acre could sequester between 200 pounds and 1,000 pounds more 
per year. The price for this activity in the U.S. could be somewhere around $10 an acre. 
A carbon market in Europe has already set the price at $8.90 a ton and farmers have been 
thus far contracted to generate 9,000 tons of carbon every year. While it is unclear 
exactly how much no-tillage farming would offset,104 experts suggest that farmers who 
sequester carbon through “no-till” techniques could reduce total carbon dioxide emissions 
by twenty percent per year. They could then sell those credits on a commodity market.105
In the end, the entrepreneurial question in GHG reductions is; how can one 
generate carbon credits at the lowest possible cost and sell them at the highest price. 
Texana Timber has found an answer to this question using rice paddies. The Texas-based 
company has always practiced sustainable forestry on its modest timber holdings but has 
begun to use its expertise in forestry economics to venture into a sequestration strategy 
that creates multiple environmental and economic benefits. In order to gain credits for 
carbon sequestration, timber must be planted on land that has been vacant for thirteen 
years (the stipulation called “additionality” makes the foresting of vacant land, such as 
cattle grazing fields more economically viable). And in order to maximize this carbon 
benefit, Texana doesn’t acquire just any land; the company acquires and converts rice 
fields into stands of new trees. This creates credits for both carbon sequestered in the 
trees and methane averted by ceasing rice production. Further, the rice fields have the 
added operational benefits of being heavily fertilized and the ability to be diked for 
flooding to maintain growth in times of drought. And they have the added environmental 
benefit of creating habitat for wildlife. The company has taken this strategy and begun to 
offer it as a service, courting investors and partners. These companies – in need of carbon 
29 
  
credits to achieve reduction goals – provide capital to acquire the land. Texana repays the 
capital with interest and gives the company the carbon credits. In exchange, Texana 
retains the land and the timber revenue. The key to the success of this economic model, 
says CEO Jack Fields is vigorous accounting and verification systems to be developed. 
And he has retained a forestry economist and a leading biologist from Rice University to 
develop such systems.106
 
7. Enhancing Human Resource Management.  
Often overlooked and under-rated, the core of all these strategies lies in the 
engagement of a company’s workforce. While technological and economic activity may 
be the direct cause of environmentally destructive behavior and may enable or drive 
possible environmental change, it is the culture of the organization that guides the 
development of that activity.
107 Amory Lovins of the Rocky Mountain Institute speaks 
often of the cultural elements of climate change strategies: 
“There is some very good news about the climate problem: we do not need to 
worry about how the climate science turns out or whether this is a real 
problem or not because we ought to do the same things about it anyway just to 
save money. The obstacles to achieving this profitable resolution are not 
technological or economic. Rather, they are cultural and procedural. They are 
what economists call ‘market failures’ — the silly rules and practices that do 
not mean anyone is dumb, but rather that the normal way we do things does 
not let us use energy in a way that saves money. Obsolete rules-of-thumb used 
throughout engineering practice are typically wrong by half to one order of 
magnitude compared with whole system life-cycle optimization, because 
they’re optimizing a little piece of the system and therefore pessimizing the 
whole system. Most of our building design is ‘infectious repetitis,’ not real 
engineering or architecture at all – partly because architects and engineers are 
rewarded for what they spend, not for what they save. Similarly our utilities, 
in almost every jurisdiction, are rewarded for selling more energy and 
penalized for cutting your bill. We have split incentives between builders and 
buyers of equipment or buildings, and between landlords and tenants. If you 
invest to save energy in your operations or home, you probably want your 
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money back about ten times as fast as utilities want their money back from 
building power plants. This ten-fold difference in discount rate is equivalent to 
about a ten-fold price distortion.”108 
 
The organizational message in Mr. Lovins’ point is two fold. First, realizing the 
strategic benefits in GHG reductions requires a change in the structure and culture of the 
organization: reward systems, training, management philosophy, employee involvement, 
reporting requirements, data collection and analysis, etc. Companies must engage 
workers as partners in identifying and enacting strategies for reducing their GHG 
emissions. For example, Ontario Power Generation challenged employees to come up 
with GHG solutions, yielding suggestions that cut its internal energy needs by more than 
2,000 gigawatts per hour and saving $90 million in energy costs.109 The Beer Store 
engaged their truck drivers in identifying ways to reduce GHG emissions through things 
like idling time, speed and transmission shifting patterns. Then it provided an education 
program that taught drivers how to drive more fuel efficiently.110 And PHH Arval offers 
client seminars to teach about the benefits of automobile fleet allocation with respect to 
carbon dioxide emissions. 
Second, the adoption of greenhouse emissions strategies can improve the morale 
of the company and thereby increase the retention rates of skilled workers, lower the 
costs of recruiting and training new ones, and attract and retain higher caliber applicants. 
An analysis by the Pew Center on Global Climate Change found that GHG reductions 
motivated employees and drove innovation within companies studied.111 In short, GHG 
reductions can be an opportunity to increase workplace productivity. Novo Nordisk, a 
Danish pharmaceuticals company, has seen its turnover rate drop to five percent, half the 
industry average since it initiated its "Values in Action" program as a way to infuse 
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sustainability principles into its strategy.112 The outdoor company, Patagonia claims to 
have 5,000 applicants for each opening, due in large part to its strong environmental and 
social mission. Such organizational initiatives are difficult to quantify in economic terms, 
yet they are real.  
 
Conclusion 
Many today are asking whether it “pays to be green.”  But the question is too 
simple in its presentation.  It is synonymous with asking whether it pays to innovate. The 
question is the wrong one.   The correct question asks whether there exists an economic 
opportunity for your company to be green vis-à-vis your competitors and then asks how 
and when that opportunity can best be achieved.  Today, many companies still see 
climate change as a scientific or social issue. Yet, the reality is that it has the strong 
potential to be strategic in nature. And as international requirements under the Kyoto 
Protocol begin to emerge and the U.S. continues to sit on the side lines, it is wise business 
strategy to use this period to reflect on whether your company can benefit from a 
voluntary reduction program that can mesh with its strategic objectives. Controls on 
GHG emissions represent a market transition; one that will affect companies 
differentially. It will yield winners and losers. Some industries will be at greater risk than 
others.  Thus, the issue pits those with an interest in resisting and trying to delay GHG 
reductions against those who will try to capitalize on them. In order to realize the extent 
to which your company will be on the winning or losing side, whether you should be 
embracing or resisting voluntary GHG reductions, comes down to an understanding of 
your GHG exposure. It will be based on the answers to questions with which most 
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corporate managers are as yet unfamiliar (see table 2). These questions force managers to 
reassess the depth of their knowledge about their operations, the development of policy, 
new sources of capital, risk management, reputation enhancement, strategic direction and 
the cultures of their organizations.   
 
Insert table 2 here 
 
But the complexity of climate strategy goes deeper.  It rests not only on the 
specifics of the individual company, but also on the context in which they find 
themselves. First, opportunities and risks will be determined by the rules of GHG 
mitigation and trading that get established. For example, how will reduction targets be 
allocated under a climate change treaty?  Will they be based on the magnitude of GHG 
emissions or on a normalized GHG intensity measure such as CO2 per BTU or CO2 per 
dollar of shipments as listed in table 3? Will they be based on the fuel mix as listed in 
table 4? Or will there be some other measure?  And beyond the exact measure, will 
suppliers by solely responsible for GHG reductions or will consumers share in the load?  
These questions will have direct bearing on who will win and who will lose in a climate 
change market transition. 
 
Insert tables 3 and 4 here 
 
Beyond such general measures, there are more specific contextual circumstances 
that are relevant towards determining who will most likely benefit from voluntary GHG 
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reductions.  For example, companies contemplating operational changes now may be 
more inclined to incorporate GHG reductions in their decision-making than companies 
with a great deal of existing operating assets, particularly if those assets are relatively 
new and have many years of operating life remaining. Each year, U.S. industry spends 
more than $700 billion on new plants and equipment. Managers must evaluate the 
investment profitability based on an expected useful lifespan. For new facilities, should a 
company include greenhouse gas reduction technologies in the initial design or take a 
chance on leaving them out with the anticipated contingency of retrofitting or buying 
credits to keep it open? If the decision is to install new technologies, should they choose 
technologies that go beyond any anticipated emission standards and allow the company to 
create a surplus of permits for sale or use elsewhere in the company? For existing 
facilities, should a company retrofit for greenhouse gas reductions later or plan to buy 
credits to keep the plant open? Based on regulatory forecasting and an economic analysis 
of the cost and benefits, many companies may decide that it is too risky to omit 
greenhouse gas reduction equipment in new plant construction projects should Kyoto, or 
some Kyoto-type objectives come into force.  
Further, companies that are heavy emitters may see a benefit by avoiding GHG 
reductions because they will not have to buy pollution permits or invest in new 
technology. Or looking more deeply, a more important question may be whether the 
company is near the limits of efficiency in its operations. In reality, it is the most energy 
and carbon inefficient companies that have the most potential for environmental and 
economic gain. The entire questions boils down to how GHG emission reductions affect 
the cost of their operations vis-à-vis their competitors.  
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Going further, utilities that can recover costs of operational changes will be more 
likely to adopt GHG reduction programs than those that cannot, as the uncertainty of the 
return on investment is minimized. Those that are more heavily invested in natural gas 
may be more inclined than those heavily invested in coal. (Those companies that are 
more invested in nuclear or renewable energy sources will also be more likely to support 
mandatory GHG controls as they will raise the costs for their fossil-fuel burning 
competitors.) Companies that exist in mature markets with little opportunity for process 
or product substitutes will be more likely to resist GHG reductions than those in evolving 
markets where alternatives are available for achieving reduction goals. And, those 
companies that supply industry sectors that embrace GHG reductions will hold a more 
favorable view of GHG reductions than those that service the more resistant fields. 
These are just a few variables by which winners and losers may be decided; those 
for which the proposition that it can pay to be green is more feasible. And once that 
determination is made, it is important to consider how companies can build on their 
strategic opportunities, creating synergistic benefits among multiple efforts. Take, for 
example, the FedEx diesel-hybrid delivery truck. If the company shifts its entire fleet to 
this type of drive train, it can possibly reduce transport operations costs and carbon 
dioxide emissions. Then it could sell its reduction credits on the open market at a profit or 
use them to offset any reductions that must be made in other areas of operations (such as 
air transport). In both cases, there are distinct financial benefits. Further, there will be a 
simultaneous reduction in particulate and sulfur dioxide emissions, which would yield 
advantages should new emission standards for diesel trucks be promulgated by the EPA. 
Going further still, the company could hasten the development of such regulations by 
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lobbying the government with proof that emissions reductions are technically feasible. 
Finally, the company may find a boost in morale from drivers who derive personal 
satisfaction from driving such trucks and they may find a boost in demand from 
consumers who may wish to do business with a company that takes such progressive 
steps. Of course, the strategic analysis would not be complete without considering the 
potential dangers if the company finished shifting its entire fleet to diesel-hybrid and an 
alternative technology, such as fuel cells, were to make a break through. These are the 
dangers in any market and technology transition. (Although it is important to note that 
unless the hydrogen for the fuel cell is created from something other than fossil fuels, the 
change in GHG emissions may not be negative).  
The future is uncertain both in terms of U.S. involvement in Kyoto and the 
strategic implications of GHG reductions. It is a time for strategic thinking. As we look 
forward and alleviate that uncertainty, both the academic researcher and the executive 
manager have something to offer. For the academic researcher, there is a great need for 
more systematic assessments of the costs and benefits of voluntary GHG reductions. The 
examples in this article are many but they are anecdotal and cut across many industry 
sectors. A more thorough causal examination between the strategies employed and 
financial performance achieved will be extremely influential in fostering more activity in 
the business and policy arenas. For the executive manager, timing may be crucial and 
waiting for the results of such a study may negate opportunities that exist now. So, to 
identify opportunities in strategic climate change strategies, companies must begin with 
the most simple of measurements to determine the extent of GHG emissions possible and 
therefore the exposure and alternatives available for reduction. Then managers must take 
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those measurements and craft more sophisticated strategic plans in a GHG market of 




Estimated annual costs, in billions of dollars, if atmospheric carbon dioxide 
concentrations double by 2050, as is widely expected.113
 
 United European Former Soviet   
 States Union Union China World 
Coastal protection & 
  loses * $8.1 $5.3 $2.4 $0.7 $49.7 
Other ecosystems $7.4 $9.8 $2.3 $2.2 $40.5 
Agriculture & forestry $8.4 $9.9 $6.8 $7.8 $42.5 
Energy industry $6.9 $7.0 -$0.7 $0.7 $0.7 
Water management $13.7 $14.0 $3.0 $1.6 $46.7 
Human casualties & 
  dislocations $17.1 $22.9 $4.1 $5.5 $86.3 
Air pollution $6.4 $3.5 $2.1 $0.2 $15.4 
Total $68.0 $72.4 $20.0 $18.7 $304.2 
Share of GDP 1.4% 1.6% 0.8% 6.1% 1.5% 
 







Questions for Exploring the Strategic Dimensions of  
Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Reductions 
 
Operational Improvement 
• What is the energy efficiency of your operations, and can you improve it? 
• Do you know how to measure your company’s production of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases (methane, 
nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorcarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride)?  
• Do you know the available technologies or alternatives for reducing emissions and the cost/benefit trade-offs 
associated with each?  
Anticipating and Influencing Climate Change Regulations  
• Do you know how to monitor and forecast the development of GHG regulations at the state, federal and 
international levels?  
• Can you influence the form of those regulations? 
Accessing New Sources of Capital 
• Do you know how to conduct commodity trading of GHG emissions and are you aware of government subsidies for 
efforts to reduce GHG emissions? 
Improving Risk Management 
• Are any of your operations at risk due to the natural consequences of climate change and do you know the financial 
implications of that exposure? 
• Do you know how to quantify your emissions and the financial liabilities they may incur should a GHG disclosure 
scheme go into force? 
Elevating Corporate Reputation 
• How is your company’s market reputation improved or harmed by its posture towards GHG reductions? 
• Do you have good relations with key constituencies that care about that posture?   
Identifying New Market Opportunities 
• Are there alternative product or process lines that you could be exploring that will become more attractive as GHG 
reduction programs proliferate? 
• Are there products or services (including GHG credits) that your company can sell to other companies who have 
decided to embark on voluntary GHG reduction programs? 
Enhancing Human Resource Management  
• Are your employees concerned about GHG emissions? 
• Would voluntary reduction initiatives improve morale, increase the retention rates of skilled workers, lower the costs 




Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Consumption of Energy: 
Total Emissions and Intensity Measures by US Industry Sector, 1998114
 
 CO2 emissions CO2 Intensity CO2 Intensity 
 (Million Metric Tons) (Million Metric Tons per (Metric Tons per 
Major Groupa  Quadrillion BTU Consumed) Million $ of Shipments) 
Petroleum & Coal (324) 322.5 42.6 2,337.5 
Chemicals (325) 327.6 45.4 786.1 
Primary Metals (331) 256.8 70.5 1,546.2 
Paper (322) 119.3 37.0 769.8 
Food (311) 86.5 59.0 202.0 
Wood Products (321) 19.4 29.8 213.3 
Total Mfg. 1,513.2 50.7 388.0 
 





Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Consumption of Energy:  
Fuel Type and US Industry Sector, 1998115
(Million Metric Tons) 
 
Major Groupa Coal Natural Gas Petroleum Electricityb Otherc
Petroleum & Coal (324) 0.0 53.2 175.0 24.5 69.8 
Chemicals (325) 28.7 125.2 56.6 112.2 4.9 
Primary Metals (331) 94.6 49.3 3.3 06.0 3.6 
Paper (322) 25.8 30.9 15.2 46.7 0.7 
Food (311) 12.2 30.0 2.8 41.4 0.1 
Wood Products (321) 0.2 3.9 1.2 14.0 0.2 
Total Mfg. 198.6 374.2 268.6 590.4 81.4 
 
a   North American Industry Classification System Code in parentheses. 
b  Carbon dioxide emitted from energy inputs used to produce electricity (including associated losses), 
derived by calculating the manufacturing sector share of the electric power sector’s total carbon dioxide 
emissions based upon the weighted share of electricity retail sales (receipts by) the manufacturing sector. 
c  Includes all other types of energy that respondents indicated were consumed or allocated, such as asphalt 
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